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Abstract: Academics in business science and elsewhere have begun to look at what Vaughan (1999) called the “dark side of 
organisations” and started to engage with the fact that people connected to cyber systems can be the source of great 
opportunity for exploitation. MacGillivray (2014) notes that organisations should be seen as socio-technical: where 
infrastructure and systems shape and are shaped by the people that work with them. The current paper puts these socio-
technical systems at the heart of cyber-attack and defence - where we see ‘cyber’ as being shorthand for any computer-
dependent technologies used to achieve dark effects on the human mind and subsequent behaviour (e.g. SMS received on 
a mobile phone).There is no logic to restrictively focussing on user behaviour around laptops and desktops. This paper 
provides some unconventional examples of cyber-attack. Our concern is with enabling decision-makers (or those supporting 
them) to challenge their assumptions about information received, adjust behaviours accordingly and thereby render them 
and their organisations increasingly resilient to the efforts of creative adversaries, no matter whether those adversaries 
motivation is commercial, political or personal. From such target-hardening arises organisational competitive advantage. 
 
Keywords: psychological, target, immunity, trap, culture 
1. Introduction 
A challenge for any organisation – commercial, public sector or military – is to detect meaningful alterations 
within (or affecting) their decision-making people and processes. Drawing on insight from the British Army – 
whose forces constantly review a planned mission through the use of the military estimate tool (‘Seven 
Questions’), our notion is that it should become intuitive to persistently ask ‘Has the situation changed?’1Indeed, 
the core message of this paper is that organisations must become adept at embedding this self-questioning into 
the fibre of their security and other practice, because cyber-threats (as a blend of the ingredients of human 
ingenuity and computer-enabled communication) are designed to bait or trigger psychological traps (cf. 
Hammond, Keeney and Raffa 1998). These traps encourage targets to either continue with, or cease, courses of 
action: to deceive individuals into the peril of believing that reality has (or has not) changed by manipulating 
situational awareness. 
 
Decision-makers, especially under conditions of “time constraints, limited and often ambiguous information, 
intense pressure, and often stark conflicts of interest” (MacGillivray 2014: 1719), seek to find easy ways to 
process of complex situations. We may, for example, trust a source of information because we have previously 
trusted it; adopt an idea because we have recently heard it or dismiss information which does not accord with 
our assumptions because we do not like it. At the level of board decision-making or in a vital function of a 
business: these errors can be extremely costly. We suggest some ways in which these errors can be rehearsed 
away from being so tempting. It will also be important for individuals to become cognisant of the fact that 
mindsets, attitudes and commonsense may be affected when they move between the thought-processes and 
places of being ‘at work’ and ‘on personal time’. The worldview of individuals needs to be adjusted to reflect 
that, just as we are never ‘off duty’ when connected to the office via phones, tablets and other tech – so too as 
employees guarding an organisation’s Intellectual Property (IP), reputation or other value - we are never ‘off 
duty’ as potential targets. 
 
At the personal level, and decision-makers may well be precisely targeted when situational awareness is low, 
even government Ministers can be easily tempted into providing intimate photographs to a Twitter 
correspondent leading to the potential for blackmail. In other real world events a USB drive is picked-up and 
taken into a corporate data centre by all employees who spot it; spoof news stories go viral within moments; 
spear-phishing attacks and fake dating profiles scam the security conscious and hopelessly romantic alike – all 
of these and more represent successful positioning and execution of psychological traps via cyber means. This 
                                                                
1Full information on the Estimate process available in British Army doctrine, here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf 
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paper will briefly describe the individual impact of some cyber-attacks and thereby extend discussion in terms 
of how these could have generated even more acute organisational impact. 
 
The approaches we set out to enhance organisational resilience to decision-targeting hold true for both 
individuals and organisations, indeed each depends on the other to attain and sustain an appropriate security 
culture. As we bring this paper to a conclusion, the fallout of the behaviour of two former Foreign Secretaries in 
the UK continues to cause ripples. Attending a meeting called by journalists purporting to represent a Chinese 
company, the then chair of the powerful House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee (and board 
member of private security companies) has resigned his Committee role and will stand down from Parliament 
at the next election. The entire scandal having been facilitated by computer-mediated communications and 
psychological playfulness. 
 
Having first set out a sense of the scale of the challenge, the authors will finally sketch a practical approach to 
hardening psychological targets. We describe early ideas for embedding an awareness and openness in 
individuals to constantly question whether their world-view remains accurate. Shock and surprise are the enemy 
of any system – vigilance to changes in the internal or external ecosystem is vital, yet difficult to attain. Being 
able to sustain such vigilance is, again, a form of competitive advantage. In addressing the major forms of 
decision-making psychological traps – we propose ways in which organisations can implement an enhanced 
approach to security culture that builds (through repetition) psychological immunity to malign intent. Our key 
ambition is to present some concepts which will enable leaders and managers to enhance their organisation and 
people’s resilience to influence by cyber means. From enhanced and accurate situational awareness, 
organisations will also increase their ability to take good risks: individuals must be empowered and enabled to 
make constructive use of the Internet and the opportunities that it can provide – perhaps the realisation that 
one can ‘hide in the open’ can help balance security with presence. 
2. Defining terms 
This section moves towards a working definition of ‘cyber-security’. This is a term which, as with so many, is 
bandied-around in media, academic and other discourse in imprecise ways. Our core interest is in people (the 
human factor) and viewing them as (a) needing to be protected from influence and (b) prevented from damaging 
the systems and processes around them (whether unwittingly or otherwise). 
 
A recent report on cybersecurity (commissioned from the Institution of Engineering and Technology by the UK 
government’s Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure – CPNI) informs us that: 
One internationally agreed definition for cyber security is ‘the collection of tools, policies, security 
concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and 
organization and user’s assets’ (IET 2013: 14). 
This definition is taken from one advanced by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)(an agency of 
the United Nations) in 2009. Even the kindest observer would concede that this all-inclusive definition is not the 
most helpful. It is so embracing that everything is covered. Indeed, in a 2014 article, Craigen, Diakun-Thibault 
and Purse noted that the term ‘cybersecurity’ “is used broadly and its definitions are highly variable, context-
bound, often subjective, and, at times, uninformative. There is a paucity of literature on what the term actually 
means and how it is situated within various contexts” (2014: 13).  
 
Indeed, we are even more bold: many of the learned and practitioner discussions about ‘cyber’ matters are 
almost entirely context-free, and in general descriptive and often vapid. Cyberspace really means ‘somewhere 
out there’ in a place here computers eventually connect (like a strange distant synapse). We argue that cyber 
must be thought of in a much more concrete way. Cyber-security is the countering of the means by which an 
end can be achieved – the persuasion of human targets to do something that they should not through (either or 
both) socio-technical means. 
 
Whilst Craigenet al. draw on a dictionary definition of cyber – unfortunately this does not really help: “’Cyber’ is 
a prefix connoting cyberspace and refers to electronic communication networks and virtual reality (Oxford, 
2014)”. This definition captures all uses of the term ‘cyber’ (which is the point of a dictionary!), but it does not 
help work out what either cyber-security or cyber-insecurity, are. Although cyber is ‘out there’ – the effects are 
felt in or achieved through the human brain and the actions it takes. All that cyber is, is a means of – via 
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computer-dependent media – communicating. The unhelpfulness of thinking of ‘cyber’ and its (in)security as 
being about cyberspace, computers, virtual reality and so on is that it generates an idea that cyber is about 
computers per se rather than things which involve computers at some point. Effects in or from computers may 
well be achieved by air-gapped humans inspired to do something as a result of information communicated via 
computers or through computer-dependent systems (e.g. mobile telephones). Alternatively, air-gapped humans 
may be persuaded to do something that threatens cybersecurity solely by another human. 
 
From the authors’ extensive experience in the public sector (government, military, law enforcement) and the 
private sector (up to and including boards and directors of security) – these viewpoints are just not held deeply 
nor strategically enough. Organisations may plan for business continuity triggers in the form of system outages 
or data corruption – but not for these other eventualities where systems are a means to an end of disrupting, 
thwarting or diverting decision-making. This may, we might speculate, simply be because the age profile of those 
at senior management and thought-leadership levels does not make it easy for them to acknowledge the 
relevance of cyber beyond conceiving of ‘it’ as just another type of infrastructure or technology. And yet one of 
the underpinning beliefs with which the authors have approached drafting this paper is that it is dangerous to 
think in this way. Hence, we contradict definitions of cyberspace such as the following: 
the electronic world created by interconnected networks of information technology and the 
information on those networks. It is a global commons where… people are linked together to 
exchange ideas, services and friendship (Public Safety Canada 2010). 
Although ‘cyber’ is indeed a global commons (like the oceans and the atmosphere), it is neither a world nor a 
virtual world. It is a technology which constitutes and is constituted by us, barely understood, in which 
communication can be achieved and availability to which is vulnerable to electronic as well as kinetic and other 
forms of attack. It enables markets, control systems, data, dating and many other functions to operate. But these 
markets, for example, do not exist any more than a roulette wheel exists on a virtual gaming table.  
 
‘Cyber’ bridges hard and soft systems, yet the alarming fact is that there are many attempts being made to limit 
cyber-security to some kind of static concept which sounds much more like the approach one would take to 
physical security in the past: “Cybersecurity entails the safeguarding of computer networks and the information 
they contain from penetration and from malicious damage or disruption” (Lewis, 2006). This is an extraordinarily 
limiting idea – because it neglects the fact that any technical system is inevitably socio-technical because they 
are created, managed, used and abused by humans. Computer networks and databases (etc.) do far more than 
just hold information subject to being destroyed or damaged: they enable decisions. Systems may be entirely 
intact, technically ‘secure’ and yet still enable a well-crafted Tweet, email, SMS, fake What’s App exchange, idea 
or other artefact to transit over them and have an effect on a decision-maker or their advisor(s). Lewis’ definition 
is really referring to network or system security – a sub-set of the overarching topic area. 
3. Cyber-scenarios: Recent events where decision-making has been influenced 
The following section provides some illustrations of where cyber (i.e. computer-enabled) communications have 
interfered powerfully with individual or organisational decision-making / judgment. This has been achieved by 
the manipulation or determination of situational awareness, i.e. the understanding of the world around the 
individual. We begin by presenting some useful definitions of situational awareness. The term is drawn from the 
study of pilots and their fast and pressured decision-making. Whilst most people will be familiar with Boyd’s 
OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) model –most will not be aware that Boyd was a USAF fighter pilot.2 Endsley, 
therefore, defines Situational Awareness (SA) as “the pilot’s internal model of the world around him at any point 
in time” (1988) – this model being synthesised from what the instruments report, what can be seen outside, 
what radar and other sensors show as well as sensory input, the benefits of memory, experience and so on. 
 
Endsley has later provided us with the useful view that SA provides “the primary basis for subsequent decision 
making and performance in the operation of complex, dynamic systems” (1995). Given the pace with which 
business is conducted and the way in which reputation, advantage and market share can be won or lost (in the 
private, public and military theatres) – these appreciations of SA are valuable. Success in commerce, 
administration and conflict is all about managing complex, dynamic systems. Another way of describing SA is 
through the use of the anthropological concept of the worldview – the internal model of how and why the 
individual and their socio-technical world works. When one thinks of a target’s situational awareness as a 
                                                                
2 A useful reading on this topic is: http://www.fastcompany.com/44983/strategy-fighter-pilot 
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‘worldview’ – it becomes more readily apparent that it is possible to model and understand the target – through 
using empathy and psychological and cultural collateral to actively or passively establish a view of that target 
and how and why they do what they do. 
 
The following vignettes provide examples of the kinds of perils that we would wish to equip individuals and 
organisations to suspect, detect and avoid in an irresistibly dynamic and open world. 
a. Willygate: Ministers in the mangle 
"Late at night, I began a series of flirtations in response to approaches from women on social 
media. Deep inside, I knew I was playing with fire. Now it has consumed me and my family" - Brooks 
Newmark MP (BBC News online 12 October 2014).  
It proved surprisingly easy for a journalist to persuade a junior Minister (Brooks Newmark MP) to send explicit 
photographs of himself to a Twitter correspondent who was someone very different to who he had assumed 
(hoped) they were. As BBC News puts it: 
he had sent pictures to a freelance reporter, who adopted the false identity of "Ms Wittams" and 
described himself on Twitter as a "twenty-something Tory PR girl". "Sophie" then contacted and 
interacted with a number of Conservative MPs via the social networking site (Ibid.). 
With a very brief back-story on ‘her’ Twitter profile, a freelance reporter found that a Minister was amenable to 
both conversation and, within a short period of time, exchange of photographs via this cyber-link. This is hardly 
the most sophisticated, nor novel, type of way of causing embarrassment to politicians or other middle-aged 
men. What is, perhaps, slightly more surprising, is that this was so easily achieved in an ever more ‘security 
conscious’ world, replete with warnings about the easy exploitation of social media. 
 
Our intention in this paper is to push speculation further. 
 
If it was so easy to detect and exploit a very conventional vulnerability in a figure in public life –we can reasonably 
assume that senior individuals in other walks of life may be just as (if not more) vulnerable. The effect sought in 
the Newmark case was clearly to generate business for a freelance journalist – but what if the effect sought 
were different? There is no reason why Newmark, a director of procurement, head of security of any other 
senior or middle-ranking individual might not be targeted on behalf of commercial rivals or others. If, rather 
than being motivated solely by generating embarrassment and media coverage in the very short term, 
Newmark’s behaviour (or that of a procurement, contract, facilities or other director or manager) had led to 
their being retained as an asset - what they might be pressured to do? For example, the threat of exposure could 
be leveraged by a criminal enterprise or others to award a contract to an uncompetitive bidder, re-open or close 
a regulatory investigation, endorse a product or service by attending functions or, simply, allow access to a site 
or a system by an unknown person. 
 
Twitter, or email, or SMS or some other computer-enabled (i.e. cyber) communications can, then, produce 
devastating effects on an individual but also, potentially, to the organisations in which they work and the 
integrity and security of their processes. The next section will extend the awareness of the reader to an even 
more unusual phenomenon which, whilst being dependent on the existence of cyber-technology, does not 
actually use it directly. 
3.1 Paper meets WhatsApp 
The authors are aware of a case where a long-standing employee in an organisation is being investigated (and 
may well be dismissed) on the basis of a WhatsApp interaction. This in itself is not surprising – but what is 
mindboggling is the fact that the employee and employer only have possession of screen-shots of the interaction 
and that the evidence itself contains signs that it is hardly likely to have been conducted by that employee. 
 
In short, the employee faces dismissal on grounds of gross misconduct (based on the content of the interaction) 
solely because the employer has reasonable belief that the interaction that the screenshots represent is real – 
and, we judge, because it fears the reputational and other effects of the allegations becoming public. It is easier 
to treat the artefact as true than try and establish that it may not be. 
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And yet, a simple search of Google reveals just how easy it is to find the software to enable fake WhatsApp (and 
other) conversations to be created (see left). But such an example encapsulates the power of cyber-attack which 
earlier restricted views of cyberspace and cybersecurity cannot engage with: in the hands of a creative and 
determined individual, an attack can be made on an individual / organisation that mat depend on leveraging 
awareness of the sensitivity of institutions to wrong-doing in their ranks, a cultural or other reluctance or inability 
to pursue the appropriate (but complicated) way to resolve the matter and a keen appreciation of where and 
what triggers are in organisations such that they have little choice but to over-react or react when they should 
not. 
 
Here, then, the situational awareness of the employer is absolutely determined by the attacker(s). A worldview 
has been created that the employer is choosing to resist challenging. The employee, meanwhile, faces the 
significant challenge of defence against a physical copy of a digital interaction, where he is unable to access the 
originals and where the employer has no understanding of the technical issues and no appetite to get to grips 
with them. 
4. The desired outcomes of cyber-attack 
In this section, we wish to briefly outline some of the effects that cyber-attacks can have on decision-making. In 
essence, because humans seek (normally sensibly) to make life as efficient in terms of energy invested as 
possible – we look for reasons to continue believing in something rather than refuting it: unless we have our 
senses alerted by a particular experience or because we have reason to be on our guard. The Internet dater who 
has had some less than perfect experiences, for example, may be a good deal more suspicious than the naïve, 
possibly desperate, lonely heart. The skill of those behind effective cyber attacks, then, is to ensure that there 
are no easily perceived reasons by those targeted or hosting the target to challenge their activities OR provide 
absolutely compelling evidence that a perception or course of action must be changed OR inject enough 
uncertainty into a decision-making process that inaction and delay are inevitable.3 
 
There are very simple rules which are designed to allow humans to avoid investing time and energy into thinking 
about a situation unless necessary. We default to look for patterns that confirm that a new situation is just like 
a similar one. Information which does threaten these patterns is likely to be dismissed – unless an organisation 
or individual has implemented challenge into its operating procedures. Decision-makers - especially under the 
conditions that MacGillivray described above (op. cit.) - seek to find easy ways to make sense of complex 
situations. Even when the situation is not one of crisis, as humans we default to imposing what we think are 
sensible, proven and unproblematic interpretations of our context. Hammond, Keeney and Raffa(1998) 
developed a summary set of such psychological traps. In the table below, we add a column paraphrasing the 
impact of these traps on assumptions of situational awareness: 
 
                                                                
3 In future work, the authors intend to also cover the fact that cyber-attacks can undermine the control of the ‘eight wastes’ of Lean 
Management, both literally and metaphorically. By, for example, casting doubt on the integrity of content and integrity of an organisation’s 
systems – normal information processing tasks can be rendered inefficient in the same way that defective items on a production line extract 
time and money if rework / recall are needed. 
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Type of Trap Impact Example 
Anchoring We assign disproportionate importance to the 
first information received 
An overheard discussion or passing 
comment in a newspaper defines the 
topic / concept. Use of stereotypes. 
Status Quo Despite the existence of better alternatives, 
we commit to continuing the current course of 
action 
Less psychological risk by sticking with 
what we know, taking action requires 
exposure to risk & its consequences. 
Research indicates that as option 
increase, the ‘pull’ of the status quo also 
rises. 
Sunk Cost Because we have already committed 
resources, we must continue 
Reluctance to divorce from poor past 
decisions. Firing a bad employee 
threatens perceptions of your judgment 
in hiring them in the first place. 
Confirming Evidence Seeking information that justifies existing 
decisions rather than supporting alternatives 
Bias in information sought and its 
interpretation. Weighting of confirming 
over opposing information, despite the 
alternatives being undeniable (e.g. 
scientifically valid). 
Framing Trap By misunderstanding what the problem is, our 
decisions are increasingly irrelevanr 
Presentation of a problem shapes what 
traps become tempting, e.g. highlight 
sunk costs. 
Overconfidence We are over-optimistic about data and 
decisions 
Range of possible outcomes narrowed 
because of false confidence in accuracy 
of assessment of what could happen / 
scope of problem. 
Prudence Risk averseness Default to over-caution, especially when 
faced with significant decisions. 
Recallability Recent, dramatic events condition the 
response. 
Something that has recently befallen or 
benefitted another gains [undeserved] 
priority and distracts from actual 
priorities. 
(adapted from Hammond, Keeney&Raiffa2006). 
 
In addition, these traps can inter-relate and affect one another. , the authors provide the examples of a: 
dramatic first impression [that] might anchor our thinking, and then we might selectively seek out 
confirming evidence to justify our initial inclination. We make a hasty decision, and that decision 
establishes a new status quo. As our sunk costs mount, we become trapped, unable to find a 
propitious time to seek out a new and possibly better course. The psychological miscues cascade, 
making it harder and harder to choose wisely (Ibid.). 
These traps are related to cognitive frames: ways that come to shape how we perceive reality. Frames are 
heuristic thinking tools – where we hold an agenda or worldview that determines our attitude to specific and 
related issues. These frames (freed from challenge by mind guards and critical thinking) are problematic: “[f]or 
the most part, our use of frames is unconscious and automatic—we use them without realizing it” (Lakoff 2006: 
9). It is this unconscious and automatic use of frames (e.g. the absence of suspicion about a change or lack of 
change in a situational picture) which is at the root of the means of hardening psychological targets against 
cyber-attack. 
5. An emerging solution to harden psychological targets 
The authors of this paper are motivated by their personal insight into the traps mentioned and the belief that 
something positive and concrete can be done to reduce the risk of them being exploited. We are part of a cluster 
of practitioner-researchers developing concepts to provide organisations with competitive advantage from 
novel, pro-active ways to engage with insider threats, embedded risks and other unconventional security 
challenges. Output from this cluster is referenced in this concluding section and indicated by an asterisk after 
the appropriate reference. 
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The need identified in this paper is for individuals and their organisations to challenge their understanding of 
their worldview / situational awareness. This is a key component of the question ‘Has the situation changed?’ 
and traditionally fundamental to intelligence analysis: 
truly effective intelligence must on occasion be “doubting” of the enterprise at hand. It must raise 
difficult – and perhaps unpleasant – questions of operational planners. It must be free to inject 
contrary evaluations of the operational situation. It must not fall victim to – nor encourage – 
wishful-thinking or a raft of other misperceptions and biases in stressful situations (Dearth: 1995: 
9). 
Drawing on our background in, respectively, strategic consultancy with the British Government and private 
sector and a distinguished career in the UK special forces community - we argue that organisations need to 
ensure that challenge is fundamental to any organisation’s assessment of and assumptions about the world, 
driven by cyber or other means. 
 
We think that existing approaches to hardening the human factor targeted through cyber means (whether more 
or less ‘technical’ in nature) are insufficient. We assume that employees in even the best communicated-to and 
compliant companies will not yet be hardened against psychological attack. This will be of particular concern to 
industries, individuals and organisations which fall within the targeting parameters of adversaries likely to 
behave in unconventional or unrestricted ways (where no technique is off limits).  
 
Our proposal is for a portfolio of techniques which organisations seeking competitive advantage would adopt, 
embed and use to test their level of hardening against cyber-attacks. These extend from implementing systems 
which enable the ready sharing of information which might be relevant, gathered and interpreted by a dedicated 
team who can feed back to, report to appropriate structures within the organisation and reward the source of 
the original disclosure. Just as suggestion-boxes can be an incredibly cost-effective way of finding solution to 
improve productivity and cut costs in production lines (see Robinson and Schroeder 2009 and Curtis 2015*), so 
listening to ‘front-line ideas’ (as Robinson and Schroeder describe them) could also be a valuable source of 
intelligence from which to build more corporate immunity. In other words, to increase the ability of an 
organisation to learn from what may be happening to and around it; to empower more sensors to provide data 
to be processed, rendered into intelligence and considered as part of the approach by which individual and 
collective security and risk profiles and awareness are adjusted. 
 
In his work tailoring and implementing lean approaches into a major manufacturing facility, Curtis (2015*) has 
achieved significant results by ensuring that all employees are genuinely involved in designing change and 
improvement processes. By investing considerable time and resources, Curtis has unlocked the problem-
detection and -solving capabilities of his workforce, delivering cost and efficiency savings and also educating, 
engaging and raising the morale of that workforce. There is no reason why cyber- and other forms of security 
cannot be tackled in exactly the same commercially savvy way. 
 
The precise means by which the collecting and collating of weak signals and early warning together will need to 
be adapted to the precise organisational environment of a business or other institution. Research such as that 
conducted by Anjali (2015*) makes concrete steps towards frameworks against which organisations could plan 
to gather and make sense of such information. Anjali also notes the role for nudge and other behavioural science 
approaches to develop a more effective means of achieving compliance with generic security protocols – such 
as overcoming human curiosity about a USB stick found outside a data centre. 
 
Drawing on insights gathered from a very highly applied environment, Macfarlane and Maharajan (2015*) have 
begun to describe how the implementation of strong and protected, no-blame alternatives to traditional whistle-
blowing mechanisms / tribunal cases inside organisations could also boost the situational awareness of boards 
and enable them to access up-to-date insight. Individuals would feel able to pass on information about 
wrongdoing in the workplace with no risk of retribution and, in an alternative scenario, have trust and confidence 
to report what they believe might have been an attempt to compromise them in their private life. The 
organisation would then provide support and care at the level of safety, security and well-being such that the 
employee gains confidence that s/he is protected and the organisation is able to issue guidance to others and 
amend its decision-making / testing of other sources and systems accordingly.  
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At all levels of an organisation, we recommend the more generalised use of ‘red-teaming’ to challenge 
assumptions and embed a questioning of ‘Has the situation changed?’ in the form of suspicion, even cynicism, 
about the ongoing value of a situational awareness assessment. Individuals should be coached to be self-
reflective around whether they are falling foul of heuristics / psychological traps. The authors endorse the 
approach to implementing critical thinking that Moore (2015*) is developing – albeit originally for a very 
different purpose, countering radicalisation / grooming in schools. So, too, boards and those that advise them 
should expose themselves to the challenge represented in scenario-driven exercises (SDEx) (cf. Hills 2015, 
forthcoming). From the repeated use of high-impact, low-cost activities such as this, organisations and the 
systems that sustain them can increase their ability to suspect manipulation and more effectively detect and 
manage the consequences of being manipulated by others.  
 
However, enhancing the ability of boards, heads of corporate security, human resources, IT and other 
departments to detect and decide on relevant actions to take requires, in our view, new forms of training and 
mentoring. Batchelor (2015*) argues that there is merit in drawing on the mental processes and disciplines of 
the special forces soldier – those individuals required to make frequent and important decisions under pressure 
and with incomplete and inconsistent information. Through immersive and other training, organisations and 
their individuals (high-profile and otherwise) can grow their competence for personal and corporate mental 
safeguards to stop individual lapses in judgement. 
 
Additional approaches would include the potential use of ‘tiger teams’ who would attempt to use creative 
techniques to overwhelm or influence individual targets in an organisation – in much the same way that ‘ethical 
hackers’ attempt to subvert security systems. The difference here being that the attempts would be targeting 
psychological security as much as technical / physical security. No doubt there would be problematic issues 
raised if, for example, an executive did accept a bribe offered by an ‘ethical tiger team’ – the organisation would 
have detected a vulnerability that an adversary / other could have exploited. How the organisation chose to deal 
with such an eventuality would require consideration. As always, however, it is better for the threat to be 
detected by the employer than by a competitor.  
 
Lewis (2015*) has taken this approach to the very grassroots level – in applying military and other approaches 
to detecting insider threats to a contentious small business sector (using animals). In this context, activists and 
others use a range of methods to build trust in often very low-tech ways. However, the insights gained from this 
research are useful as the exploits – being social in nature – could be undertaken via cyber means.  
 
These vignettes of current research and conceptual development underline some sources of insight that could 
be drawn upon to harden psychological targets in organisations. Growing the immunity, resilience and 
protective questioning of employees at all levels of an organisation to cyber attack is a potential source of great 
competitive advantage to individual companies, industry sector and nation states. Achieving this target 
hardening is not easy – but neither is it impossible.  
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